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INTRODUCTION 
 
The future of policing will be driven by data.  Crime, criminals, and patterns 
of criminal activity will be reduced to data to be studied, crunched, and predicted.1  
Police departments across the United States—like the civilian population—will 
learn to adapt to ever-shifting technological innovations and efficiencies.2  The 
question of adoption is not “if,” but “when,” and any delay largely will be a 
function of money and police culture. 
The benefits of big data policing involve smarter policing, faster 
investigation, predictive deterrence, and the ability to visualize crime problems in 
new ways.3  Not surprisingly then, police administrators have been seeking out 
new partnerships with sophisticated private data companies and experimenting 
with new surveillance technologies.4  In Chicago, Los Angeles, New York City, 
Miami, Boston, and other smaller cities and towns, the beginning of a big data 
policing mindset is developing.5 
This potential future, however, has a very present limitation.  It is a limitation 
largely ignored by adopting jurisdictions and could, if left unaddressed, 
                                                                                                                                      
*   Professor of Law, UDC David A. Clarke School of Law.  Thank you to Ric Simmons for 
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Data and Criminal Law. 
1   See generally Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Policing Predictive Policing, 94 WASH. U. L. 
REV. 1113 (2017); Ric Simmons, Quantifying Criminal Procedure: How to Unlock the Potential of 
Big Data in Our Criminal Justice System, 2016 MICH. ST. L. REV. 947 (2016). 
2   See Charlie Beck & Colleen McCue, Predictive Policing: What Can We Learn from Wal-
Mart and Amazon About Fighting Crime in a Recession?, POLICE CHIEF (Mar. 13, 2014), 
http://www.policechiefmagazine.org/predictive-policing-what-can-we-learn-from-wal-mart-and-
amazon-about-fighting-crime-in-a-recession/ [http://perma.cc/D6HM-GA2T]. 
3   See generally Sarah Brayne, Big Data Surveillance: The Case of Policing, 82 AM. SOC. 
REV. 977 (2017); Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Big Data and Predictive Reasonable Suspicion, 163 U. 
PA. L. REV. 327 (2015); Elizabeth E. Joh, Policing by Numbers: Big Data and the Fourth 
Amendment, 89 WASH. L. REV. 35 (2014); Andrew D. Selbst, Disparate Impact in Big Data Policing, 
52 GA. L. REV. 109 (2017). 
4   See, e.g., Mark Harris, How Peter Thiel’s Secretive Data Company Pushed into Policing, 
WIRED (Aug. 9, 2017, 9:40 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/how-peter-thiels-secretive-data-
company-pushed-into-policing/ [https://perma.cc/G8NP-N7PL]; Jacques Peretti, Palantir: The 
‘Special Ops’ Tech Giant that Wields as Much Real-World Power as Google, GUARDIAN (July 30, 
2017, 9:59 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jul/30/palantir-peter-thiel-cia-data-crime-
police [https://perma.cc/F493-SE4J]. 
5   See Ferguson, supra note 1, at 1115–17. 
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delegitimize the adoption and use of new data-driven technologies.  Simply put: all 
big data policing technologies have a “black data” problem.6 
As I have written previously, “black data” connotes three overlapping 
concerns.7  First, big data policing is opaque, lacking transparency because most of 
the magic happens as a result of “black box” proprietary and mathematically 
complex algorithms.8  Second, big data policing is racially encoded, colored by the 
history of real-world policing that disproportionality impacts communities of 
color.9  Police data comes from the real world, and all of the long-standing 
discriminatory impacts of implicit and explicit bias color that data.10  Black data is 
black, brown, and marked by disproportionate impacts on communities of color.11  
Finally, big data policing faces legal uncertainty as old constitutional doctrines 
built on small data principles no longer work in the new big data age.12  The future 
path of traditional Fourth Amendment law is uncertain, dark, and distorted.  These 
different types of darkness make it difficult to see the future clearly.  Black data 
must be illuminated so that the positive elements of algorithmic insights and crime 
prevention can be used without negatively impacting privacy, liberty, or the well-
being of citizens subject to new forms of police surveillance. 
To work as intended, big data policing technologies must address this lack of 
transparency, the legacy of racial discrimination, and the constitutional uncertainty 
arising from application in the real world.  This brief essay, part of a symposium 
on Big Data and Criminal Law, seeks to raise the questions that must be resolved 
to overcome the black data problem.  This symposium essay examines: (1) the 
puzzle of data-driven transparency; (2) the concern of biased data; and (3) the 
struggle for constitutional clarity in the face of new technologies. 
 
I. THE GROWTH OF BIG DATA POLICING 
 
To ground our discussion, it is important to be clear about the type of 
technologies which might fall under the big data policing tent.13  At present, there 
are three broad categories of technology: predictive technologies, surveillance 
technologies, and data mining technologies—all are data-driven innovations which 
                                                                                                                                      
6   ANDREW GUTHRIE FERGUSON, THE RISE OF BIG DATA POLICING: SURVEILLANCE, RACE, AND 
THE FUTURE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT 3–4, 131 (2017). 
7   Id. at 3. 
8   Id. at 136–40. 
9   Id. at 131–36. 
10  Id. 
11  Id. 
12  Id. at 140–42. 
13  See Ferguson, supra note 3, at 352–73. 
2018] ILLUMINATING BLACK DATA POLICING 505 
 
have been adopted by law enforcement to augment police strategies of deterrence, 
monitoring, and investigation.14 
First, predictive analytics are being used by law enforcement in the form of 
place-based predictive policing and person-based targeting.15  Both of these 
strategies share the same core approach that algorithms can be developed to 
identify risk patterns from collected police data.16  For example, place-based 
predictive policing might take historic crime data, or environmental risk factors, or 
some combination thereof, and combine it with other variables (day of the week, 
time, weather, etc.) to forecast crimes.17  The data can be fed into a computer 
model that seeks to identify geographic areas that may be more at risk of crime 
than other areas, either because of crime patterns, risks in the environment, or 
some other factor.18  The outputs—usually maps of micro-areas of forecast risk—
can be provided to police officers as they patrol, thus allowing police to effectively 
respond to crime patterns in a city.19  Person-based targeting involves using past 
data about criminal activities (arrests, age at the time of offense, criminal 
associates, past violence, etc.) and then using that information to predict those 
individuals most at risk of violence (either as victims or perpetrators).20  In places 
like Chicago, Illinois, the Strategic Subjects List (the so-called “heat list”) of 
                                                                                                                                      
14  See Kate Crawford & Jason Schultz, Big Data and Due Process: Toward a Framework to 
Redress Predictive Privacy Harms, 55 B.C. L. REV. 93, 104–05 (2014) (predictive analytics); Rachel 
Levinson-Waldman, Hiding in Plain Sight: A Fourth Amendment Framework for Analyzing 
Government Surveillance in Public, 66 EMORY L.J. 527, 534 (2017) (surveillance); Steven D. 
Seybold, Note, Somebody’s Watching Me: Civilian Oversight of Data-Collection Technologies, 93 
TEX. L. REV. 1029, 1032 (2015) (surveillance); Tal Z. Zarsky, Governmental Data Mining and Its 
Alternatives, 116 PENN ST. L. REV. 285, 287 (2011) (data mining). 
15  Predictive Policing, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.nij.gov/topics/law-enforcement
/strategies/predictive-policing/Pages/welcome.aspx [https://perma.cc/525K-ZGMX] (last modified 
June 9, 2014). 
16  See Ferguson, supra note 1, at 1126–28. 
17  See AZAVEA, HUNCHLAB: UNDER THE HOOD (2015), https://cdn.azavea.com/pdfs/hunchlab/
HunchLab-Under-the-Hood.pdf [https://perma.cc/RPT4-5JDM]; How Predictive Policing Works, 
PREDPOL, https://www.predpol.com/how-predictive-policing-works/ [https://perma.cc/84TG-G6EF] 
(last visited Mar. 25, 2018); RUTGERS CTR. ON PUB. SEC., RISK TERRAIN MODELING COMPENDIUM 
(Joel M. Caplan & Leslie W. Kennedy eds., 2011). 
18  See G.O. Mohler et al., Randomized Controlled Field Trials of Predictive Policing, 110 J. 
AM. STAT. ASS’N 1399 (2015); Aaron Mendelson, Can LAPD Anticipate Crime with ‘Predictive 
Policing’?, CAL. REP. (Sept. 9, 2013), https://www.scpr.org/programs/take-two/2013/09/09/33630/
can-lapd-anticipate-crime-with-predictive-policing/ [https://perma.cc/ZQS2-2ZJ2]. 
19  See Tessa Stuart, Santa Cruz’s Predictive Policing Experiment, SANTACRUZ.COM (Feb. 14, 
2012), http://www.santacruz.com/news/santa_cruzs_predictive_policing_experiment.html [https://
perma.cc/U2YD-VPYC]. 
20  Jeremey Gorner, Chicago Police Use ‘Heat List’ as Strategy to Prevent Violence, CHI. 
TRIB. (Aug. 21, 2013), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2013-08-21/news/ct-met-heat-list-20130821
_1_chicago-police-commander-andrew-papachristos-heat-list [https://perma.cc/GKJ7-29LQ]. 
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targeted individuals ranks the people deemed most at-risk in the city.21  Police and 
social service interventions can be planned around this list as sort of a public health 
strategy to prevent future violence.22  In addition, the numerical risk score is 
displayed on the dashboard of police computers, advising police officers of the 
relative risk of the individual they happen to be stopping.23 
Surveillance technologies in the form of monitoring advancements can watch, 
hear, smell, sense, and automatically record and respond to things occurring in 
public.24  In lower Manhattan, a growing network of 9,000 linked cameras provide 
real-time video to a centralized command center.25  Automated programs search 
for faces, license plates, and other suspicious activity.26  In Baltimore, traditional 
surveillance cameras are augmented by aerial cameras and sensors.27  Entire 
neighborhoods have been filmed for days by private companies with the 
surveillance data searchable for particular crimes which later can be turned over to 
police.28  In other cities, police body cameras provide days’ worth of images 
                                                                                                                                      
21  Editorial Board, Who Will Kill or Be Killed in Violence-Plagued Chicago? The Algorithm 
Knows, CHI. TRIB. (May 10, 2016, 5:00 PM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/opinion/
editorials/ct-gangs-police-loury-algorithm-edit-md-20160510-story.html [https://perma.cc/ZMV4-8A
89]; Gorner, supra note 20; Mark Guarino, Can Math Stop Murder?, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (July 
20, 2014), https://www.csmonitor.com/USA/2014/0720/Can-math-stop-murder [https://perma.cc/4X
ZC-NBLP]. 
22  Andrew V. Papachristos, CPD’s Crucial Choice: Treat Its List as Offenders or as Potential 
Victims?, CHI. TRIB. (July 29, 2016, 10:00 AM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/opinion/
commentary/ct-gun-violence-list-chicago-police-murder-perspec-0801-jm-20160729-story.html 
[https://perma.cc/MTH5-AHE5]. 
23  Josh Kaplan, Predictive Policing and the Long Road to Transparency, SOUTH SIDE WKLY. 
(July 12, 2017), https://southsideweekly.com/predictive-policing-long-road-transparency/ [https://
perma.cc/XE7F-2G4L]. 
24  See generally Bennett Capers, Crime, Surveillance, and Communities, 40 FORDHAM URB. 
L.J. 959 (2013); CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, PRIVACY AT RISK: THE NEW GOVERNMENT SURVEILLANCE 
AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT (2007); Christopher Slobogin, Public Privacy: Camera Surveillance 
of Public Places and the Right to Anonymity, 72 MISS. L.J. 213 (2002). 
25  Thomas H. Davenport, How Big Data is Helping the NYPD Solve Crimes Faster, FORTUNE 
(July 17, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/07/17/big-data-nypd-situational-awareness/ [https://perma.
cc/4EAP-NLCU]; see also Somini Sengupta, Privacy Fears Grow as Cities Increase Surveillance, 
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 13, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/14/technology/privacy-fears-as-
surveillance-grows-in-cities.html [https://perma.cc/78CW-PVJ4]. 
26  See AOL, Digisensory Technologies Avista Smart Sensors, YOUTUBE (Sept. 14, 2012), 
www.youtube.com/watch?v=JamGobiS5wg [https://perma.cc/NTK7-BGY7]; Associated Press, NJ 
City Leading Way in Crime-Fighting Tech, CBS  NEWS (June 19, 2010, 9:30 AM), https://www.
cbsnews.com/news/nj-city-leading-way-in-crime-fighting-tech/ [https://perma.cc/GFG4-5YY5]. 
27  Monte Reel, Secret Cameras Record Baltimore’s Every Move from Above, BLOOMBERG 
BUSINESSWEEK (Aug. 23, 2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/features/2016-baltimore-secret-
surveillance/ [https://perma.cc/ZAB4-2CMD]. 
28  Craig Timberg, New Surveillance Technology Can Track Everyone in an Area for Several 
Hours at a Time, WASH. POST (Feb. 5, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/
technology/new-surveillance-technology-can-track-everyone-in-an-area-for-several-hours-at-a-
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uploaded to large data warehouses.29  In Chicago, audio sensors record gunshots.30  
In Washington D.C., chemical sensors record suspicious substances.31  All across 
the country, cell signals and digital clues held by third parties can be requested or 
even directly intercepted by IMSI (“stingray”) devices.32  All across the internet 
landscape, social media can be watched and monitored for criminal activity.33  All 
of this data, big and small, usable and quite revealing, can be monitored by law 
enforcement. 
Third, growing data collection capabilities have provided incentives to create 
new search technologies to interrogate the information.  Federal law enforcement 
entities have developed massive criminal justice databases filled with personal 
information.34  States have developed smaller versions.35  Biometric databases now 
include information about DNA, fingerprints, iris scans, tattoos, gait, facial 
recognition, and other physical markers.36  These government databases have been 
                                                                                                                                                      
time/2014/02/05/82f1556e-876f-11e3-a5bd-844629433ba3_story.html?utm_term=.145394dbdb2b 
[https://perma.cc/6SJN-HK6P]. 
29  Matt Stroud, The Company That’s Livestreaming Police Body Camera Footage Right Now, 
MOTHERBOARD (July 27, 2016, 6:00 AM), https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/9a3ddv/visual-
labs-police-body-camera-livestream [https://perma.cc/5782-MSGR]. 
30  Patrick M. O’Connell, Chicago Police Announce Expanded Technology to Curb Shootings, 
CHI. TRIB. (Jan. 27, 2017, 4:59 PM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/breaking/ct-chicago-
police-shotspotter-technology-met-20170127-story.html [https://perma.cc/TX99-VFCQ]. 
31  Michael J. Penders & William L. Thomas, Ecoterror: Rethinking Environmental Security 
After September 11, 16 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 159, 160 (2002). 
32  Stephanie K. Pell & Christopher Soghoian, A Lot More Than a Pen Register, and Less 
Than a Wiretap: What the StingRay Teaches Us About How Congress Should Approach the Reform 
of Law Enforcement Surveillance Authorities, 16 YALE J.L. & TECH. 134, 142 (2013). 
33  Ben Austen, Public Enemies: Social Media Is Fueling Gang Wars in Chicago, WIRED 
(Sept. 17, 2013, 6:30 AM), http://www.wired.com/underwire/2013/09/gangs-of-social-media/ 
[https://perma.cc/C2D4-ADXN]; Joseph Goldstein & J. David Goodman, Seeking Clues to Gangs 
and Crime, Detectives Monitor Internet Rap Videos, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 7, 2014), https://
www.nytimes.com/2014/01/08/nyregion/seeking-clues-to-gangs-and-crime-detectives-monitor-
internet-rap-videos.html [https://perma.cc/UY78-VTX7]; Heather Kelly, Police Embrace Social 
Media as Crime-Fighting Tool, CNN (Aug. 30, 2012, 5:23 PM), http://www.cnn.
com/2012/08/30/tech/social-media/fighting-crime-social-media [https://perma.cc/DAU2-KR5L]. 
34  Erin Murphy, Databases, Doctrine, and Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 37 FORDHAM 
URB. L.J. 803, 806–08 (2009); BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FUSION 
CENTER GUIDELINES 2 (2006), https://it.ojp.gov/documents/fusion_center_guidelines_law_enforce
ment.pdf [https://perma.cc/8U4Q-6KHK]. 
35  Stephen Mercer & Jessica Gabel, Shadow Dwellers: The Underregulated World of State 
and Local DNA Databases, 69 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 639, 681 (2014). 
36  Laura K. Donohue, Technological Leap, Statutory Gap, and Constitutional Abyss: Remote 
Biometric Identification Comes of Age, 97 MINN. L. REV. 407, 436–38 (2012); Ellen Nakashima, FBI 
Prepares Vast Database of Biometrics, WASH. POST (Dec. 22, 2007), http://www.
washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/12/21/AR2007122102544.html [https://perma.cc/
QED3-STBY]; Wayne A. Logan, Policing Identity, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1561, 1575 & n.91 (2012); Craig 
Timberg & Ellen Nakashima, State Photo-ID Databases Become Troves for Police, WASH. POST 
(June 16, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/technology/state-photo-id-databases-
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augmented on occasion by private data originally collected by for-profit data-
broker companies.37  Like other consumers, law enforcement can purchase the 
available data to build larger systems.38  All of this data can be analyzed using 
powerful computers and algorithms to divine hidden patterns and clues.39  Crimes 
can be solved, suspects can be identified, and unseen connections revealed. 
All of these technologies rely on data collection and analysis, with varying 
degrees in the amount of data assembled.  For example, place-based predictive 
policing companies use collected crime statistics, which in large cities involves a 
significant number of ever-changing data points (depending on the technology 
used).40  However, person-based predictive policing uses fewer inputs to identify 
at-risk individuals, usually limited to traditional criminal justice inputs (arrests, 
convictions, etc.).41  While data collection may target all of the people arrested in a 
big city like Chicago, the types of data are not terribly extensive (especially 
compared to other big data projects).  Surveillance technologies can encompass a 
tremendous amount of information if one thinks about the accumulated digital 
footage of all police-worn body cameras, or all networked surveillance cameras, or 
all cell site and other digital surveillance technologies.  In addition, data mining 
usually involves vast amounts of collected data, but again the definition of “vast” 
compared to other types of datasets in a big data world may not be too 
                                                                                                                                                      
become-troves-for-police/2013/06/16/6f014bd4-ced5-11e2-8845-d970ccb04497_story.html?
utm_term=.c9c85764f6f8 [https://perma.cc/BK9S-T3YH]; Sara Reardon, FBI Launches $1 Billion 
Face Recognition Project, NEW SCIENTIST (Sept. 7, 2012), https://www.newscientist.com/article/
mg21528804-200-fbi-launches-1-billion-face-recognition-project/ [https://perma.cc/5ZSC-W78C]. 
37  Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Big Brother’s Little Helpers: How ChoicePoint and Other 
Commercial Data Brokers Collect and Package Your Data for Law Enforcement, 29 N.C. J. INT’L L. 
& COM. REG. 595 (2004); Andrea Peterson, Your Location History Is Like a Fingerprint. And Cops 
Can Get It Without a Warrant., WASH. POST (July 31, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/news/the-switch/wp/2013/07/31/your-location-history-is-like-a-fingerprint-and-cops-can-get-it-
without-a-warrant/?utm_term=.32d84715062a [https://perma.cc/JW46-RLA2]. 
38  Bob Sullivan, Who’s Buying Cell Phone Records Online? Cops, NBC NEWS (June 20, 
2006, 11:59 AM), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/12534959/ [https://perma.cc/Q5MX-EKMT]; 
Hoofnagle, supra note 37, at 597. 
39  See Christopher Slobogin, Government Data Mining and the Fourth Amendment, 75 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 317, 322–23 (2008); Christopher Slobogin, Transaction Surveillance by the 
Government, 75 MISS. L.J. 139, 167–82 (2005). 
40  DAVID ROBINSON & LOGAN KOEPKE, UPTURN, STUCK IN A PATTERN: EARLY EVIDENCE ON 
“PREDICTIVE POLICING” AND CIVIL RIGHTS 3–5 (2016), https://www.teamupturn.org/reports/2016/
stuck-in-a-pattern [https://perma.cc/PH9H-X48T].  However, some companies use only a very 
limited dataset.  For example, PredPol, a leading predictive policing company only uses three data 
points (crime type, time, and location).  PREDPOL, supra note 17. 
41  Kaplan, supra note 23 (this information might include things like: “1.  Age at most recent 
arrest (the younger the age, the higher the score); 2.  Incidents where victim of a shooting; 3.  
Incidents where victim of an assault or battery; 4.  Violent crime arrests; 5.  Unlawful use of weapons 
arrests; 6.  Narcotics arrests (Wernick claimed that this is the least impactful variable, and does not 
seem to matter that much to the model); 7.  Trend in criminal activity (essentially whether or not an 
individual’s rate of criminal activity is increasing or decreasing)”). 
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overwhelming.42  A biometric search of DNA in the FBI CODIS database is a 
search of about 11.6 million records, which covers a lot of people, but is a 
relatively small number for some big data systems.43  More expansive biometric 
databases are being collected to search everything from iris patterns to tattoos, 
which increases the variables, but still remains much smaller than other big data 
projects.44 
The point of this overview is that big data policing provides a broad definition 
of new law enforcement technologies which share certain similarities.  These 
technologies are digital with varying (but increasing) capabilities to collect, store, 
and analyze the information.  And, for purposes of this essay, because these 
technologies emerge from the real world of policing, they all share the same big 
impediment: the problem of black data.  As this essay seeks to offer insights for the 
future of criminal law, big data, and the promotion of justice, the next sections 
raise questions that must be answered on the theme of black data. 
 
II. THE BLACK DATA PROBLEM 
 
Big data policing is the future of law enforcement.  But, it is a future that has 
yet to confront the overlapping problems of transparency, racial bias, and 
constitutional distortion.  The solutions to the black data problem are not simple or 
easy, but are necessary to engage in order to create a system that will be trusted by 
communities and police alike.  This Part seeks to examine the concerns that give 
rise to the black data problem in the hopes that by exposing the issues, solutions 
will emerge before wide-scale adoption of these new technologies. 
 
A. Transparency: Black Data Is Opaque 
 
Big data policing has a transparency problem.  By and large, ordinary citizens 
cannot peer behind the algorithms that now control police patrol routes or human 
target lists.45  More complicatedly, in some cases the code itself cannot be 
interrogated, because of how machine learning and artificial intelligence systems 
work.46  These machines learn from past data without human input, and thus 
cannot simply be examined to reveal the code.47  Similarly, because of tactical and 
                                                                                                                                      
42  VIKTOR MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & KENNETH CUKIER, BIG DATA: A REVOLUTION THAT WILL 
TRANSFORM HOW WE LIVE, WORK, AND THINK 9 (2013). 
43  Margaret Hu, Small Data Surveillance v. Big Data Cybersurveillance, 42 PEPP. L. REV. 
773, 794–99, 821 (2015). 
44  Donohue, supra note 36, at 415. 
45  See Stuart, supra note 19; Nissa Rhee, Study Casts Doubt on Chicago Police’s Secretive 
“Heat List,” CHI. MAG. (Aug. 17, 2016), http://www.chicagomag.com/city-life/August-2016/
Chicago-Police-Data/ [https://perma.cc/5Z7E-F77E]; Simmons, supra note 1, at 994. 
46  Selbst, supra note 3. 
47  Joshua A. Kroll et al., Accountable Algorithms, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 633, 679–80 (2017). 
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safety considerations, police are reluctant to reveal the locations and use of 
surveillance technologies.  From a law enforcement perspective, it does little good 
to expose the existence of surveillance schemes so that anyone can evade them. 
These three transparency problems involving (1) technical barriers, (2) 
technological barriers, and (3) tactical barriers must be overcome for big data 
policing to be a success.  Unless police address the transparency problems, 
communities will not trust the systems.  And, without solutions to the transparency 
problem, police will have no way to gain that trust. 
 
1. Technical Barriers 
 
At a very basic level, the use of highly-technical systems undermines 
transparency.  Most police administrators and officers are not computer scientists 
and must remain largely dependent on private companies to provide technical 
guidance.48  In practice, this means that police purchase big data technologies 
without the ability to interrogate them or even understand them.  For patrol officers 
on the street, this means blindly following predictive policing patrols without the 
ability to challenge the findings or deconstruct its assumptions.  For administrators, 
it means trusting the algorithm based on the theory (or perhaps the result), but 
without being able to articulate why the system works.49  This lack of transparency 
is even more problematic when applied to predictive policing of individuals.  A 
police officer can see the result of the heightened “risk score,” but cannot really 
explain how the score was calculated.  As more and more bits of data get inputted 
into a system, the more complicated it can be to visualize or explain the outputs.  
For all intents and purposes, the data systems are dark to the end users and the 
community. 
Similar problems exist with automated surveillance monitoring 
technologies.50  Video systems pre-programed to alert to suspicious bags, audio 
sensors, or facial recognition matches are susceptible to the limitations of the 
programming.51  While the systems themselves are transparent about the 
                                                                                                                                      
48  Elizabeth E. Joh, The Undue Influence of Surveillance Technology Companies on Policing, 
92 N.Y.U.  L. REV. 101, 125, 130 (2017). 
49  Some companies have countered this concern by specifically addressing the “why” of why 
a predictive technology works.  Risk Terrain Modeling is one technology that focuses on the why.  
See Samantha Melamed, Can Atlantic City’s Bold Experiment Take Racial Bias out of Predictive 
Policing?, PHILA. INQUIRER (Aug. 10, 2017, 5:03 AM), http://www.philly.com/philly/news/
crime/atlantic-city-risk-terrain-modeling-rutgers-predictive-policing-joel-caplan-20170810.html 
[https://perma.cc/6E8Y-7EVH]. 
50  Michael L. Rich, Machine Learning, Automated Suspicion Algorithms, and the Fourth 
Amendment, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 871, 898–901 (2016). 
51  For example, Shotspotter technology designed to identify gun shots can also mistakenly 
identify fireworks.  Peter Nickeas et al., Chicago Police Express Frustration After More Than 100 
Shot in Violent Fourth of July Weekend, CHI. TRIB. (July 6, 2017, 6:30 AM), http://www.
chicagotribune.com/news/local/breaking/ct-chicago-july-4-weekend-shootings-violence-20170705-
story.html [https://perma.cc/4R3G-CCF8].  Or threat scores that are designed to identify dangerous 
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information they are providing to police, there is little ability to determine if the 
automated alert will be accurate.  So, for example, in a system that has been 
programmed to automatically identify “hand-to-hand transactions” on the street (to 
signify a potential drug deal),52 the officers may end up responding to an alert 
without the ability to understand why the computer alerted to a particular place or 
action.  Officers must blindly trust the system without being able to see or interpret 
the alerts. 
Even something as simple as a static database has technical issues in terms of 
being able to correct or audit the information.  As criminal justice databases have 
grown, there has been a parallel recognition that errors go uncorrected, systems go 
unexamined, and injustices result.53  Much of the problem is that ordinary people 
cannot see within the system, and even experts cannot fix data that is shared 
among interconnected systems.54  So, an individual may not know about the 
database error, but even if they did learn about it, a systems professional may not 
be able to correct the errors among the proliferating and interconnected systems 
that have been designed in a largely ad hoc manner.  Once data gets corrupted, it is 
very hard to see or cleanse the error throughout the various systems.55 
 
2. Technological Barriers 
 
Beyond technical literacy, the very nature of big data technology thwarts 
transparency.  First, at a most basic level, computer code and algorithms hide the 
inner workings of the systems.56  In addition, many predictive policing systems are 
commercial operations, being privately owned and sold to law enforcement by 
companies that wish to keep their trade secrets private.57  Naturally, in order to 
protect the value of their commercial technology, companies try to keep the 
                                                                                                                                                      
households can erroneously flag an innocent house.  Justin Jouvenal, The New Way Police Are 
Surveilling You: Calculating Your Threat ‘Score,’ WASH. POST (Jan. 10, 2016), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/local/public-safety/the-new-way-police-are-surveilling-you-calculating-your-
threat-score/2016/01/10/e42bccac-8e15-11e5-baf4-bdf37355da0c_story.html?utm_term=.682fa
950438e [https://perma.cc/5QQT-XY86]; CLARE GARVIE, ALVARO BEDOYA & JONATHAN FRANKLE, 
GEO. L. CTR. ON PRIVACY & TECH., THE PERPETUAL LINE-UP: UNREGULATED POLICE FACIAL 
RECOGNITION IN AMERICA (2016), www.perpetuallineup.org [https://perma.cc/L83J-MULS]. 
52  See AOL, supra note 26. 
53  Wayne A. Logan & Andrew G. Ferguson, Policing Criminal Justice Data, 101 MINN. L. 
REV. 541, 541–44, 568–71 (2016). 
54  Alex R. Hess, Note, Herring v. United States: Are Errors in Government Databases 
Preventing Defendants from Receiving Fair Trials?, 11 J. HIGH TECH. L. 129, 147 (2010). 
55  Logan & Ferguson, supra note 53, at 588–91. 
56  See Paul Ford, What is Code?, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (June 11, 2015), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2015-paul-ford-what-is-code/ [https://perma.cc/C99E-PN3Y]. 
57  See Joh, supra note 48, at 119; Ellen Huet, Server and Protect: Predictive Policing Firm 
PredPol Promises to Map Crime Before It Happens, FORBES (Feb. 11, 2015, 6:00 AM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/ellenhuet/2015/02/11/predpol-predictive-policing/#79a6c0e94f9b 
[https://perma.cc/TTP9-SN67]. 
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systems hidden.58  Finally, the systems are complex, vacuuming up vast amounts 
of data every day and trying to process this information for practical use.  In the 
real world of stopping and solving crime, there is less room for reflection or 
auditing of the data.  While, of course, one would hope such accountability checks 
would be put in place, in practice, the pressures of daily data collection and 
analysis make such retrospective evaluations less of a priority than stopping the 
next crime. 
In the future, as more systems become more dependent on machine learning 
and artificial intelligence, transparency will become even more difficult.  With 
newer big data models, the systems will be designed to teach themselves through 
artificial intelligence, such that the model will constantly evolve based on 
continuous learning.59  In such a system, the concept of transparency becomes 
almost meaningless because one cannot interrogate the past system for future 
insight, because the past system has already changed.60  In addition, the creators of 
the model do not know what the model is doing to get the output because the 
machine has been taught to learn from itself and not some visible, programed 
input. 
 
3. Tactical Barriers 
 
Compounding the technical and technological difficulties are the realities of 
police tactics.  In the pursuit of catching bad guys, police prefer not to reveal their 
proactive investigative strategies.  Revealing the placement of surveillance sensors, 
or how the heat list is created, might provide tactical advantage for those 
individuals trying to avoid detection.61  Police, thus, naturally avoid transparency 
in order to keep this perceived tactical advantage.  Such caution sounds in part as a 
desire to ensure effectiveness and officer safety, but also speaks to a traditional 
philosophy to keep police practices relatively closed from public view.62  As many 
                                                                                                                                      
58  Darwin Bond-Graham & Ali Winston, All Tomorrow’s Crimes: The Future of Policing 
Looks a Lot Like Good Branding, S.F. WKLY. (Oct. 30, 2013), http://archives.sfweekly.com/
sanfrancisco/all-tomorrows-crimes-the-future-of-policing-looks-a-lot-like-good-branding/Content?
oid=2827968&showFullText=true [https://perma.cc/G35D-F543]. 
59  Kroll et al., supra note 47, at 679–82. 
60  Id. at 657–60. 
61  Noah Hurowitz, NYPD Terrorism Boss Blasts Council Surveillance Oversight Bill as 
‘Insane,’ DNAINFO (June 14, 2017, 2:46 PM), https://www.dnainfo.com/new-york/20170614/civic-
center/surveillance-act-nypd-council-oversight-terrorism-commissioner [https://perma.cc/8KC2-8PC
J] (quoting John Miller, Deputy Commissioner of Intelligence and Counterterrorism, “Terrorists and 
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62  Rachel Harmon, Why Do We (Still) Lack Data on Policing?, 96 MARQ. L. REV. 1119, 1129 
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police reformers have found, police processes remain decidedly non-transparent, 
with the adoption of new technologies producing no different result.63 
 
4. Consequences 
 
The consequences of these transparency problems create a real barrier to the 
successful implementation of big data policing technologies.  Secrecy leads to 
community distrust.  Complexity leads to outsourcing to third party experts.  And, 
for police and the communities alike, the technical, technological, and tactical 
barriers make it difficult to understand if the systems work as advertised.  The 
failure to address these transparency issues risks delegitimizing data-driven 
strategies, even if the technologies improve policing. 
The push for transparency (or at least accountability) has created some 
pressure to change the technologies.  New predictive policing companies have 
advertised themselves as being more transparent, even going so far as to release 
their basic code and describe their computer models’ approach to removing bias.64  
Others have exposed their underlying models to academic scrutiny,65 and yet 
others have explicitly attempted to explain why the outputs from the models come 
out the way they do.66  Some of this transparency is driven by public political 
pressure over use, and some is driven by internal concern that the systems need to 
work before investing police money in the systems.  In recent years, there have 
been more than a few glimmers of light illuminating the transparency and 
accountability problem. 
 
B. Race: Black Data is Racially-Encoded 
 
Big data policing is still policing, and law enforcement has long struggled 
with concerns of racial bias.67  Adding in data collection and analysis or new 
                                                                                                                                      
63  See id. at 1133. 
64  Joshua Brustein, The Ex-Cop at the Center of Controversy over Crime Prediction Tech, 
BLOOMBERG TECH. (July 10, 2017, 5:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2017-07-
10/the-ex-cop-at-the-center-of-controversy-over-crime-prediction-tech [https://perma.cc/R25N-2D
3A]; Dave Gershgorn, Software Used to Predict Crime Can Now Be Scoured for Bias, QUARTZ (Mar. 
22, 2017), https://qz.com/938635/a-predictive-policing-startup-released-all-its-code-so-it-can-be-
scoured-for-bias/ [https://perma.cc/U9B3-DFPT]. 
65  See, e.g., JIE XU ET AL., RUTGERS CTR. ON PUB. SEC., CRIME GENERATORS FOR SHOOTINGS IN 
URBAN AREAS: A TEST USING CONDITIONAL LOCATIONAL INTERDEPENDENCE AS AN EXTENSION OF 
RISK TERRAIN MODELING (2010); Joel M. Caplan et al., Joint Utility of Event-Dependent and 
Environmental Crime Analysis Techniques for Violent Crime Forecasting, 59 CRIME & DELINQ. 243 
(2013); Mohler et al., supra note 18. 
66  See, e.g., LESLIE KENNEDY ET AL., RUTGERS CTR. ON PUB. SEC., A MULTI-JURISDICTIONAL 
TEST OF RISK TERRAIN MODELING AND A PLACE-BASED EVALUATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL RISK-BASED 
PATROL DEPLOYMENT STRATEGIES (2015). 
67  See PAUL BUTLER, CHOKEHOLD: POLICING BLACK MEN 59–61 (2017); POLICING THE BLACK 
MAN: ARREST, PROSECUTION, AND IMPRISONMENT 178–233 (Angela J. Davis ed., 2017). 
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surveillance systems does not remove the potential threat of racial discrimination.68  
The data collected, the streets watched, and the police themselves do not change 
just because of new technologies.  Big data policing cannot ignore the resulting 
racial impact, and in order to be successful, must address the complex realities of 
policing and race in many American cities.  How police patrol, how they respond 
to problem areas, and how they deal with communities without political power all 
can potentially influence the discriminatory impact of big data policing and 
thereby expose the problem of black data policing. 
 
1. Police Patterns 
 
In some jurisdictions, race and place are so closely intertwined that policing 
certain places means a disproportionate impact on communities of color.69  If the 
crime data collected from particular areas becomes the only data in the system, 
then police data systems will mirror police patrols, not necessarily actual crime 
rates.70 
In addition, not all crime is reported in what we know as official crime 
statistics.71  For example, if police arrests become a data point for crime statistics, a 
strategic focus on particular communities of color could result in discriminatory 
outcomes.  Other distortions can occur because certain communities may not report 
crime.  One DOJ report claimed that more than 50% of violent crime goes 
unreported.72  Other researchers have correctly noted that certain crimes (sexual 
assault and domestic violence) remain seriously underreported to police.73  In 
recent months, due to a crackdown on immigration enforcement, police have seen 
                                                                                                                                      
68  See Ezekiel Edwards, Predictive Policing Software Is More Accurate at Predicting Polic-
ing Than Predicting Crime, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 31, 2016, 2:58 PM), https://www.huffington
post.com/entry/predictive-policing-reform_us_57c6ffe0e4b0e60d31dc9120 [http://perma.cc/D79F-6
MJV]; Alvaro M. Bedoya, The Color of Surveillance, SLATE (Jan. 18, 2016, 5:55 AM), 
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69  See generally I. Bennett Capers, Policing, Race, and Place, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 43, 
62–71 (2009). 
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INSIDER (Oct. 10, 2016, 7:02 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/predictive-policing-
discriminatory-police-crime-2016-10 [https://perma.cc/RF2N-4WN8]. 
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72  Id. 
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Jeannie Suk, Criminal Law Comes Home, 116 YALE L.J. 2 (2006). 
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a marked decrease in reported crimes in areas with high Latino populations.74  This 
decrease is not necessarily the result of less crime, but rather less reporting due to a 
fear of community members being deported. 
Because of this fear of biased or incomplete data, several predictive policing 
technologies have specifically avoided including any arrest data in their models.75  
Instead, they rely on reported crimes or calls for service, assuming that allegations 
of crime victimhood (i.e. calling police for assistance) will be more representative 
than police suspicion in the form of arrests.76  Not all predictive policing 
companies follow this limitation and so the impact of patrol patterns and police 
targeting could impact the final results, depending on the system chosen. 
In addition, person-based predictive models may result in seemingly racially 
discriminatory effects.  For example, if the algorithm that identifies people on the 
heat list includes information about prior arrests, or connections with people who 
are arrested, then where police are looking for arrests will impact the resulting risk 
identification system.77  Obviously, to be arrested police need probable cause to 
arrest, and a number of violent arrests could be reasonable data points to record 
and utilize in an algorithm, but there may still be a racial impact if some of the 
variables involve arrests (even if justified by good police practice).  More 
problematic are gang affiliations, which tend to correlate with racial minorities in 
many cities and have no standardized method of correctly identifying gang 
members.78  Errors proliferate in gang systems, meaning that this data can impact 
risk scores and therefore police interaction with those individuals.79 
Complicating the racial impact is the fact that crime does tend to correlate 
with poverty and in many urban areas those poor areas also correlate with 
communities of color.80  The people getting shot in cities like Chicago, New 
                                                                                                                                      
74  John Burnett, New Immigration Crackdowns Creating ‘Chilling Effect’ on Crime 
Reporting, NPR (May 25, 2017, 4:54 AM), https://www.npr.org/2017/05/25/529513771/new-
immigration-crackdowns-creating-chilling-effect-on-crime-reporting [https://perma.cc/SRD3-4CAZ]. 
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Orleans, Kansas City, and New York City are disproportionately minority men.81  
Police are using technology to identify people they think are involved in violence, 
and a review of the individuals who make the top risk scores on the heat list in 
Chicago show that they are young men of color.  Further, many individuals 
suspected to be in gangs, or who associate with individuals involved in crime, 
share race-similar friend groups.  If associational suspicion from friend groups is 
part of the analysis, then people of the same social groups will be more likely to be 
linked in the same network. 
This is not to say that predictive policing is intentionally racially 
discriminatory, but only that, like traditional policing, it suffers from implicit and 
explicit racial biases, and tracks the structural problems inherent in policing.82  
None of the algorithms use race in their model (and in fact strip it out), but the 
perception (correctly) is that the technologies end up targeting communities of 
color. 
Some of the challenge has been to overcome media reports and research 
reports that sensationalize the potential racial issues.83  For example, a recent 
report by the Human Rights Data Analysis Group applied arrest and drug data 
using PredPol’s algorithm to conclude that such an algorithm could contribute to 
racial bias,84 despite the fact that PredPol does not use any drug crimes or arrest 
data in its model.  The resulting media coverage misleadingly slammed PredPol for 
being racially discriminatory.85 
In order for big data policing to be accepted, it will need to address and 
overcome this perceived race problem.  Predictive policing technologies will be 
looked at with deserved suspicion unless they can assure communities they do not 
reify racial inequalities.  This assurance is difficult when the end result looks 
discriminatory (or looks to justify a racially disparate effect).  The stated concern is 
that predictive technologies could create a self-fulfilling feedback loop where 
biased data collection predicts future biased patrols, which in turn creates more 
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suspicion in these areas.86  Worse, the predictive scores can be justified because of 
the “objectivity” of the data, ignoring that all of the data collection comes from 
human police officers. 
 
2. Power and Powerlessness 
 
Poor communities of color have had a fraught history with police 
surveillance.  In fact, the history of policing is deeply intertwined with racialized 
police practices.87  From the post-slavery patrols, to surveillance of the civil rights 
movement in the 1960s, to monitoring of the Black Lives Matter movement in this 
decade, African-Americans have felt the negative impact of police surveillance in 
pointed and pervasive ways.88  And, during the entire span of those movements, 
every day police surveillance and harassment has been a point of tension in poor, 
minority communities.89 
Racial bias, thus, remains a concern for the implementation of big data 
policing techniques.  While inanimate algorithms or surveillance cameras cannot 
be racially biased, how the technologies are built, used, and where they are located 
can have discriminatory impacts.  For this reason, some concern has been raised 
about the implementation of certain big data surveillance techniques.  The 
Baltimore Police and the FBI used aerial surveillance on police brutality protesters 
after the death of Freddie Gray, as part of a pattern of surveillance of individuals 
involved with the Movement for Black Lives.90  Large scale aerial mass 
surveillance has been conducted on poor minority areas (including Compton, 
California, and West Baltimore), and use of the other types of high tech 
surveillance has been directed at minority neighborhoods.91  For communities 
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conscious of racial inequality in policing, these initial big data policing 
experiments signal a pattern to use such technologies more on poor communities of 
color, than non-minority communities. 
It is important not to overstate the placement issue because predictive policing 
technologies have been applied across jurisdictions and surveillance technologies 
have also been placed in business districts and places of great wealth and power.92  
But, politically weak communities face a greater risk and danger from the 
implementation.  If history is any guide, “color of surveillance”93 tends to be black 
and brown and dark. 
 
3. Consequences 
 
From one perspective, surveillance technologies could offer the potential for 
unbiased policing strategies both by removing race from the computer models and 
relying on objective surveillance and sensor technologies.  In fact, this is one 
reason why these technologies have been embraced by communities struggling 
with police-citizen racial tensions (heightened over the last few years).94  But, if 
implemented carelessly, or without recognition of the racial and discriminatory 
impacts (real or perceived) arising from traditional policing practices, these same 
technologies can become perceived as illegitimate. 
Police need to confront these legacy effects of racial discrimination and not 
pretend that they do not also impact a data-driven policing strategy.  In addition, 
because of this historical (mis)understanding, police must not blind themselves to 
the reality that some of their data-driven insights may be influenced by biased data.  
There exists a real concern of creating a self-reinforcing feedback loop which is 
driven more by police patterns than crime patterns.  There also exists a potential to 
create two surveillance systems—one focused on poor people and another on 
communities that have the political and economic means to keep the cameras 
away. 
Fortunately, companies have begun prioritizing avoiding racial bias.  Because 
of the media coverage about possible racial bias, and the growing community 
concern, police and predictive policing companies have sought ways to avoid 
biased impacts.  While certainly not solved, the issue of race is flagged and will 
likely not be papered over by an appeal to technological objectivity.  For all the 
fancy math, the reality of big data policing is that it still involves human police 
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officers and human criminal suspects and the ability of technologists to adapt to 
this known human fallibility. 
 
C. Law: Black Data Is Distorting Constitutional Doctrine 
 
Big data technologies threaten to distort a Fourth Amendment doctrine that 
emerged from a small data era.95  Early court decisions which interpreted probable 
cause and reasonable suspicion did so in a context where much of the information 
came from small data sources—namely police observation, analogue police 
investigation, and local information sharing.96  These small data rules can become 
distorted in a big data world, where mass surveillance systems, mass data 
collection, and data mining radically expand the available inputs.97  Because there 
exists more data to sort through, when that information is applied against a small 
data rule, it can change how police and courts interpret suspicion.98  In addition, 
more extensive surveillance technology has already begun to alter privacy 
expectations in a world of “panvasive” monitoring.99 
As a general matter, courts have not addressed the legal implications of the 
rise of big data policing.  A few courts have weighed in on the dangers of data 
error,100 and more have wrestled with expectations of privacy in an interconnected, 
digital age101 (including the Supreme Court which will decide how the Fourth 
Amendment should apply to cell-site location tracking in Carpenter v. United 
States).102  But, by in large, courts have not had to think through the potential 
distortions of new technology on old law.  This section briefly summarizes a few 
of the questions presented by big data policing. 
 
1. Shadows Around Suspicion 
 
Accepting arguendo that predictive policing achieves what it promises—the 
ability to forecast higher risk places and people who might be involved in crime, 
then it is important to understand how that prediction might impact police officers 
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on the streets and judges in court.  Or, in other words, how does a prediction 
impact Fourth Amendment reasonable suspicion? 
Take, for example, the use of place-based predictive policing technology in a 
city.  Officers are provided a map (paper or digital) that signals the higher risk 
areas of crime.  Police officers are tasked to patrol these areas when time permits 
within their other duties in the hopes that the additional police presence at the 
correct places will deter criminal activity.  From a police officer’s perspective, a 
computer algorithm has provided some additional information about the likelihood 
of a particular activity at a particular place and a particular time.  Police officers 
are not told what to do with this information, but one can imagine that it not only 
does, but probably should, impact how police view the areas in which they patrol.  
As they drive through a predicted area, police will be on the lookout for 
individuals who might be likely thieves.  The predictive information will color 
how they view the actions in those areas and may result in tipping the scales in 
favor of suspicion.103  After all, the suspicious man loitering near a parked car 
might just be waiting for a ride, but he might also be waiting to steal one. 
The issue becomes even more difficult in court.  If the officer does stop the 
man, and if the man does have implements of car theft (slim jim, screwdriver, high 
tech lock pick, etc.), there will be a question of whether this evidence should be 
suppressed under the Fourth Amendment.  A judge will face the following legal 
question: did the officer have reasonable suspicion to stop a man loitering near a 
parked car, and does the fact that the suspect was in an area of predicted car theft 
impact the constitutional analysis?  I have written previously about how I think the 
analysis might come out, but the short answer is that we do not know what a judge 
might do.104 
Similarly, right now in Chicago the police have incorporated their “heat list” 
risk score into their police computer dashboard.105  The result is that this number 
(1-500+) shows up next to the letters SSL (strategic subjects list) to symbolize a 
forecast level of risk of violence.  This information provides a revealing and 
perhaps damning context of the individual’s potential risk of violence.  Whereas 
before an officer might judge the individual based on actions (what did the 
individual do to justify police suspicion), now this observational information can 
be filtered through a data-rich criminal background history.  As currently utilized, 
this heat list has become a “virtual most wanted list” shortcut for individuals 
suspected of being involved in crime.106 
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But, the real ground-breaking shift will be when facial recognition technology 
can be used to match individuals on the street to risk-scores in a computer.107  
While currently such real-time facial recognition technology does not exist—being 
limited to stationary video cameras—the technology is being developed to deploy 
facial recognition on police cameras and even police body-worn cameras.108  In 
this new world, the combination of facial recognition and the heat list will mean 
that each person on the street can be scored and tracked. 
Again, in thinking about suspicion, if police observed the suspect loitering by 
the car in an area of predicted car theft and also were alerted to the fact that the 
man had three prior convictions for car theft, then the question will be how this 
information should impact reasonable suspicion.  From the police officer’s 
perspective, this additional information adds to the suspicion.  Knowing the 
suspect is a three-time convicted car thief makes it more likely that he might be up 
to no good this time.  On the other hand, even former car thieves have the right to 
wait on the street without being stopped by police.  More troubling, if merely 
being in the predicted area with a high risk score is enough for suspicion, then the 
algorithm (not the individual’s actions or the police officer’s observation) is 
reducing the level of Fourth Amendment protection.  The basic point is that the 
predicted risk score distorts traditional Fourth Amendment analysis because such 
information will likely impact the police officer’s determination of suspicion.109 
So far, courts have not weighed in on the subject of how predictive policing 
impacts the Fourth Amendment.  But, clearly predictive analytics has the potential 
to distort existing Fourth Amendment doctrine.  Because there exists more 
information about each suspect, this background information will alter the 
judgment of police, and the court’s deference to this discretionary decision.  Before 
big data analytics becomes too engrained in police practice, courts and lawyers 
will need to address the impact of these new technologies on the Fourth 
Amendment. 
 
2. Shadows Around Surveillance 
 
The rise of new surveillance technologies has already begun to impact the 
Fourth Amendment’s conception of privacy.  In two recent cases, the Supreme 
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Court has recognized the revealing nature of smartphones and digital GPS 
tracking.110  The 2017–18 Carpenter case will address the future of the third party 
doctrine in a world where almost all digital devices and communications go 
through third party intermediaries.111  Law enforcement routinely requests records 
for cell sites, internet searches, smart devices, transportation services (like Uber 
and Lyft), and many other types of digital clues.  This form of investigation will 
only increase in the future, thus, creating new legal challenges.112 
Constitutional law, as it usually does, muddles along applying analogue 
analogies to digital realities, and doing the best it can to adapt to a new age.113  
But, many of the questions about expectations of privacy are still unanswered.  The 
internet of things is turning our old-fashioned “effects” into trackable 
technologies.114  Almost all of the things we used to think as our “papers” now 
exist in digital (non-paper) form.115  Our “houses” are becoming “smart,” revealing 
intimate details through smart monitors and devices.116  Even our “persons” can be 
augmented with digitally revealing medical devices and sensors.  In fact, in an age 
of ubiquitous connectivity and mass surveillance, the idea of expectations of 
privacy may need to be rethought. 
The problem of black data policing raises all of these complicated questions.  
What society once understood to be the legal framework for analysis can appear 
distorted through a big data lens.  Generally speaking legislatures have not acted to 
keep statutory law current with technological threats, so privacy protections remain 
                                                                                                                                      
110 Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2491 (2014); United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 418 
(2012) (Alito, J., concurring); see also Ric Simmons, The Missed Opportunities of Riley v. 
California, 12 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 253, 262 (2014). 
111 As a disclosure, I co-authored the Brief of Scholars of Criminal Procedure and Privacy as 
Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner Timothy Carpenter, Carpenter v. United States, No. 16-402 
(Aug. 14, 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3019294 [https://perma.cc/U7
A4-L2FT]; see generally Stephen E. Henderson, Beyond the (Current) Fourth Amendment: 
Protecting Third-Party Information, Third Parties, and the Rest of Us Too, 34 PEPP. L. REV. 975, 
1015 (2007). 
112 See Spenser S. Hsu, Warrantless Requests to Track Cellphones, Internet Use Grew 
Sevenfold in D.C. in Three Years, WASH. POST (July 18, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
local/public-safety/court-warrantless-requests-to-track-cellphones-internet-use-grew-sevenfold-in-dc-
in-three-years/2017/07/18/b284ac32-6b36-11e7-9c15-177740635e83_story.html?utm_term=.f86602d
370e7 [http://perma.cc/W7S9-VAHG]. 
113 See James J. Tomkovicz, Technology and the Threshold of the Fourth Amendment: A Tale 
of Two Futures, 72 MISS. L.J. 317, 324–26 (2002); Ric Simmons, From Katz to Kyllo: A Blueprint 
for Adapting the Fourth Amendment to Twenty-First Century Technologies, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 1303, 
1321–22 (2002); see generally SLOBOGIN, supra note 24. 
114 Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, The Internet of Things and the Fourth Amendment of Effects, 
104 CALIF. L. REV. 805, 823 (2016). 
115 Donald A. Dripps, “Dearest Property”: Digital Evidence and the History of Private 
“Papers” as Special Objects of Search and Seizure, 103 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 49, 51 (2013). 
116 Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, The “Smart” Fourth Amendment, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 547, 
585 (2017). 
2018] ILLUMINATING BLACK DATA POLICING 523 
 
fragmented and unclear.  New surveillance technologies are eroding privacy, but 
what the law has to say about the matter is largely unclear. 
 
3. Consequences 
 
The legal system is not unused to adapting to new technologies.117  The 
difficulty is that the technologies change much faster than the law.  Courts are 
relatively slow compared to the ever-changing landscape of technology.  Big cases 
will arise with some guidance from the Supreme Court, but most of the 
development will happen slowly, case by case. 
Police will also adapt to new legal realities.  As one example of how 
predictive policing companies might adapt to potential legal challenge, HunchLab 
initially marketed a predictive policing product that provided risk maps that 
changed as the officers drove through the area.118  For example, an officer might 
drive from a high burglary area to a high theft area and watch the map change 
colors as she drove.119  But, recognizing that this knowledge might distort the 
officer’s suspicion or actions, Hunchlab decided to “blind” the officer to the type 
of crime at issue.  In doing so, they tried to address the distortions of suspicion and 
the potential bias. 
 
HunchLab’s approach to overcoming bias is to provide less information, 
not more.  It doesn’t tell police why a box is selected or even whether it’s 
a high- or average-risk zone. . . .  HunchLab works off the notion it’s 
better for officers not to know too much. 
 
“This shouldn’t be justification to stop someone,” [Jeremy] Heffner [of 
HunchLab] said.  “That’s why we actually hide a lot from the officers.  
We don’t tell them the likelihood that a robbery will happen, because 
people get hung up on probabilities.  The goal isn’t to go into these 
places and make a bunch of arrests.  The goal is to have nothing 
happen.”120 
 
Such a change might well avoid the concerns of an algorithm distorting reasonable 
suspicion.  It might also provide a helpful random-control sample to be able to test 
HunchLab’s theory.  Of course, the change might prove to be not quite as effective 
as providing that crime-type information to officers tasked to stop crime.  In the 
current moment, the debate about the appropriate balance between effectiveness 
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and bias-prevention has yet to be worked out as technologies continue to develop 
and respond to legal and community pressure. 
 
III. CONTEXTUALIZING THE DARKNESS OF BLACK DATA POLICING 
 
The problems of black data—transparency, racial bias, and unclear 
constitutional protections—are not really new to policing.  Traditional policing 
suffers from many of the same problems.  What is interesting is the way digital 
technologies expose or heighten the risks of these problems in a more visual way.  
With data, one can see the long-standing problems more clearly. 
First, as to this heightening effect, it would be misleading to characterize 
policing as having been an overly transparent profession.  For years, it has been 
difficult to get any good data on policing practices (who was stopped, why, or how 
often).121  Because of the fragmented nature of the policing profession, it has 
always been hard to see general patterns or study national practices.122  And, of 
course, one cannot get inside a police administrator’s or police officer’s head to see 
how the decisions about suspicion actually occur.  So, it seems somewhat unfair to 
criticize an opaque algorithm shaping police suspicion as being a new problem. 
Yet, the fear of opaqueness—the perceived general lack of accountability 
surrounding big data policing—is real and has been a powerful argument against 
predictive policing and other new technologies.  It somehow seems more obvious 
to highlight the black box nature of the computer model than the black box nature 
of the human mind.  Perhaps the difference is that we see the algorithmic models 
as new and thus changeable, and do not see the same with people.  But, the fear is 
clearly a heightened one that comes from an uncomfortableness with new 
technology. 
Similarly, researchers have solid empirical evidence that racial bias (both 
explicit and implicit) has affected policing patterns in the past (and the present).123  
So, again it seems a bit unfair to critique big data models for being biased when 
they are in fact equal, or even less biased than the status quo.  Yet, even though we 
know that bias exists in policing, that human failing somehow feels less 
threatening than a computer making a similar bad judgment.  With a computer 
program we have a thing that caused the error which might make it easier to cast a 
skeptical eye, rather than indicting the entire policing system as biased. 
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Finally, most scholars agree that the Fourth Amendment reasonable suspicion 
standard is not a model of clarity.124  Most police officers would likely agree as 
they are constantly second guessed in court and on the streets.  The limited training 
in the police academy about “reasonable suspicion” or “probable cause” provides 
little concrete guidance on the streets, so frustration can grow about the lack of 
clear rules.  The fact that technology may also distort these unclear rules may thus 
not reveal a new problem.  And, depending on how the information is provided, it 
might actually refine the process of establishing reasonable suspicion.125 
Perhaps this heightened focus on big data policing will be a positive thing, 
because maybe the concern about black data will allow us to address some of the 
underlying problems of all too human policing.  The truth is that it is easier to be 
vigilant about computer code than people.  Code or computer models can be 
designed to be accountable (if not transparent), to be policed for bias, and to be 
regulated by legal rules.  Unlike people, designers can test the inputs, and test the 
outputs.  Unlike people, we can relatively easily change the system when we have 
identified the problems.  In fact, each of the black data problems of opacity, human 
judgment, and uncertain rules are routine design problems for most data-driven 
systems. 
The difficulty is that police or technologists have not started from this premise 
of designing a system that focuses on the black data problems.  Instead, much of 
the technology has been sold as papering over some of those underlying human 
issues.  In a world where the community is concerned about police brutality, data-
driven policing sounds like an objective solution.  So, the focus has been on selling 
big data systems, not addressing black data problems.  If overcoming black data 
policing becomes a priority, and the hard questions about design are asked at the 
outset, many of the problems, and much of the fear of a big data policing future, 
can be illuminated and addressed. 
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